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Abstract 20 
1. Understanding conservation issues requires understanding human values as an 21 
integral part of the discourse on conservation problems and potential solutions. In a 22 
previous series of papers (Sutherland et al., 2018), we summarise the use of a range of 23 
social science methods in conservation decision making.  24 
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2. Moon et al. (submitted) claim that the special issue risks narrowing the scope of 25 
social science research and suggest that we presented a limited perspective on the 26 
field. They thereby criticise the special issue for not doing something that it never 27 
intended to do in the first instance. We did not claim that the list of articles covered in 28 
the special issue is a comprehensive list (which it obviously is not) and we are unclear 29 
why anyone would think it is. 30 
3. While we consider the Moon et al. (submitted) paper to be a useful contribution for 31 
conservation scientists wishing to use social science methods as a supplementary 32 
paper, it serves less as a critique to the special issue. Moon et al.’s (submitted) paper 33 
makes few direct and substantive criticisms of points raised in the special issue. We 34 
respond to areas of contention referring specifically to research philosophy, bias, and 35 
data reporting.  36 
4. Moon et al. (submitted) criticise the set of papers for perpetuating an objectivist view 37 
of the world. We believe that it would be rather disconcerting for the research 38 
community if there were no social truths to discover. Rather, social science research 39 
methods, (e.g. interviews and focus groups), conducted in specific places can be good 40 
ways of exploring how truths vary in different contexts. 41 
5. We also note that Moon et al. (submitted) completely missed the point we were trying 42 
to make about psychological biases, which are quite different to the issues associated 43 
with researcher bias highlighted by them. 44 
6. We encourage readers to pay close attention to the use of social science methods in 45 
conservation science. We reiterate, however, that the main purpose of the special issue 46 
was to ensure that social science methodologies for decision making are accessible for 47 
all conservation scientists to use, regardless of disciplinary background. 48 
 49 
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 52 
Introduction 53 
Moon et al. (submitted) welcomed the aims of the special issue, and set out to provide 54 
additional insights into social science research philosophies, as well as presenting further 55 
methods, which the special issue did not have room to consider. In relation to their main point 56 
that the special issue underplayed the value of understanding research philosophies, this is a 57 
point that we do not dispute in any of the articles in the special issue. We agree with Moon et 58 
al. (submitted) that a deeper understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of social science 59 
research is needed given the disciplinary training of most readers of Methods in Ecology and 60 
Evolution. We do not say that these philosophies are unimportant, but deliberately present 61 
accessible ‘how-to guides’ in the instrumental journal of Methods in Ecology and Evolution, 62 
for which undue attention on research philosophies would feel out of place. Thus, we encourage 63 
researchers to view the paper by Moon et al. (submitted) as an additional paper to the special 64 
issue, rather than a response to any claims made by the original set of papers. While the Moon 65 
et al. (submitted) response certainly does provide an understanding of the ‘potential for social 66 
science methods to improve research’, so does the original special issue.  67 
 68 
We agree with their contention that there are many other social science techniques that could 69 
be used to understand conservation decision-making, including those presented in Table 1 70 
(Moon et al., submitted). Yet, we never say that the list of articles covered in the special issue 71 
is a comprehensive list (which it obviously is not); we are unclear why anyone would think it 72 
is.  73 
 74 
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In this response, we further elaborate on social science research philosophies and comment on 75 
the treatment of objectivism, bias and data reporting by Moon et al. (submitted), which we 76 
argue suffers from significant flaws. Before doing this, we respond directly to minor areas of 77 
contention. 78 
 79 
Response to minor criticisms 80 
Data vs methods: We agree with the contention of Moon et al. (submitted) that the special issue 81 
ought to have described its purpose as presenting a ‘how-to’ guide for various social science 82 
methodologies in conservation science, rather than simply qualitative methods. Some of the 83 
methods described in the special issue, including focus groups and interviews, could produce 84 
both qualitative and quantitative data. Although mainly producing data in the forms of words, 85 
these could be used in a qualitative fashion and/or to make quantitative statements, such as how 86 
many interviewees made a particular claim.  87 
 88 
Use of terms “social science” and “qualitative”: We note the problem of using the terms 89 
‘qualitative’ and ‘social science’ misleadingly as synonyms. Amusingly, although Moon et al. 90 
(submitted) emphasise the point and criticise the special issue, the quote they issue, falls into 91 
the same trap. The quote used to make their point is actually from one of the responding authors 92 
(St. John, 2014)) but with ‘qualitative’ in the original quotation replacing the phrase ‘social 93 
science’. This illustrates the ease of considering ‘social science’ and ‘qualitative’ as 94 
interchangeable. 95 
 96 
Philosophy 97 
 98 
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The aim of articles in Methods in Ecology and Evolution is to elaborate upon specific 99 
methods (within 5000 - 6000 words) rather than examine broad philosophical issues. The 100 
special issue throws light upon a set of articles on qualitative techniques with a strict word 101 
limit. Thus we strived to restrict our description of the techniques without trying to cover 102 
epistemological jargon (e.g. objectivism, constructionism, subjectivism). As such, the reader 103 
is expected to be aware of the epistemological and ontological rationale that have led them to 104 
consider using these techniques, as opposed to the vast majority of positivist techniques 105 
covered in the journal. We also agree with Moon et al (submitted) that such broader 106 
discussion could be included in the supplementary material, a point made in the original 107 
special issue (see Young et al, 2018). 108 
 109 
Moon et al. (submitted) also observe that the unique value of social science data in 110 
understanding how and why, instead of simply ‘what’”. Methods in Ecology and Evolution is 111 
a journal on methods. Answering “why” in detail in a methods journal such as MEE was 112 
beyond the journal’s scope. As Moon et al. (submitted) themselves state, much of social 113 
science research is about the context, it is logical to assume that the “why” will be determined 114 
by the specific research context. In addition, we have tried to capture the contexts in which 115 
the methods were used in each of the articles based on a review the best available 116 
contemporary evidence.   117 
 118 
Moon et al, (submitted) implicitly assume a linear relationship between research philosophy 119 
and research design (line 91-94). In Crotty’s (1998) own words, researchers rarely begin with 120 
identifying the ontology and epistemology first in their research design. These are often 121 
determined by the specific research context and the line of enquiry:  122 
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“Not too many of us embark on a piece of social research with epistemology as our 123 
starting point….We typically start with a real-life issue that needs to be addressed, a 124 
problem that needs to be solved, a question that needs to be answered. We plan our 125 
research in terms of that issue or problem or question….In this way our research 126 
question, incorporating the purposes of our research, leads us to methodology and 127 
methods”.  128 
 129 
In fact, Crotty (1998, pg 14) explains it rather succinctly, when he states that the “great 130 
divide” between qualitative and quantitative research occurs at the level of methods and not 131 
at the higher level of epistemology and ontology. We therefore recommend researchers to 132 
reflect on the initial and implicit ontological and epistemic leanings from an early stage in 133 
their research even if it does not form the starting point. This will help clarify the 134 
epistemological issues that are often ignored or undervalued. 135 
 136 
Objectivism 137 
Moon et al. (submitted) criticise the set of papers for perpetuating an objectivist view of the 138 
world that suggests that the ‘objective’ truth can be discovered. They argue that multiple 139 
truths, or versions of reality can exist simultaneously (constructionism), and thus setting out 140 
to find the truth in a positivist fashion is often misguided in social research. On the face of it, 141 
it would be rather disconcerting for the research community if there were no social truths to 142 
discover. However, we agree with the authors that multiple versions of reality are held by 143 
different people in different places, particularly in a post-normal conservation world (Rose, 144 
2018).  145 
 146 
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Indeed, this logic underpins the emphasis on fieldwork across the social sciences (which is 147 
not a discipline as Moon et al. [submitted] claim), particularly in disciplines such as 148 
Geography. Epistemic relativism posits that truth varies from person to person, with 149 
philosophers such as Kant arguing that we can perhaps never fully understand what things are 150 
like ‘in themselves’ (see Higgins, 2016). Higgins (2016) uses the example of reality from a 151 
human perspective versus that of from the viewpoint of a fly; surely it holds true that each 152 
would see the world differently. We thus agree with the need to investigate forensically how 153 
views about conservation vary from place-to-place, but also how they differ across 154 
communities within a specific place. Social science research methods, however, such as 155 
interviews and focus groups, conducted in specific places can be good ways of exploring how 156 
truths vary in different contexts. We disagree that there is not a truth, or there are not truths, 157 
which can sometimes be found by social research. Indeed it would be questionable to suggest 158 
that even the most extreme relativists, such as Nietzsche, would categorically reject the 159 
notion that there are absolutely no truths in the world (Higgins, 2016).  160 
 161 
We also argue that social science methodologies can, and should, sometimes be used to 162 
generalise and to try, where possible, to be representative of a studied population. We cannot 163 
justify the costs of conducting fieldwork in every place in order to gain the view from 164 
everywhere (Sutherland et al., 2018). Thus, if we do not select case studies and attempt to 165 
generalise in some way, we are in danger of not being able to provide the view from 166 
anywhere. We did not make the claim in the special issue that social science methodologies 167 
should always attempt to generalise. We would indeed support a venture to send an army of 168 
anthropologists and geographers to every place on Earth in order that generalisation using 169 
social data was not necessary. However, till we find an adequate funding and socially-170 
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justifiable, sustainable model to underpin this, generalisation seems to be the most sensible 171 
approach where appropriate.  172 
 173 
Bias 174 
The context of bias in the entire special issue is that of cognitive bias (psychological bias) 175 
(see section 3.3, page 60, as well as Table 2 in Mukherjee et al, 2018). Moon et al. 176 
(submitted) arguments are actually based on researcher bias, particularly in their discussion 177 
of the inherent subjectivity (or better ‘bias’) in many social science methods. As a direct 178 
response to our articles, this criticism is not valid. While it provides an eloquent description 179 
of researcher bias in social science research (with which we agree), the authors have missed 180 
the point about cognitive biases that we were trying to make. Nowhere in the special issue 181 
have we tried to downplay the significance of researcher bias, which is indeed a very critical 182 
aspect of social science research.  183 
 184 
While we accept the challenges of dealing with error and bias, and appreciate that these 185 
cannot be completely eliminated, we are dismayed by the philosophical approach of 186 
accepting that the research is biased, and reflecting on why that is, rather than attempting to 187 
improve the rigour of the research to get a better answer. Subjectivity and bias may be 188 
‘inevitable’ as Moon et al. (submitted) describe, but we should not treat it in a blasé way 189 
without considering how it can be reduced as much as possible.  190 
 191 
Depth of reporting  192 
 193 
The response by Moon et al. (submitted) note that social science methodologies should be 194 
reported on in detail, a point made in several places in the special issue (e.g. Young et al., 195 
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2018). Like the special issue, they state that it is important to report on all methodological 196 
decisions made so that the credibility and robustness of the research can be judged, and 197 
elements replicated (which we sincerely agree with). Rather than include these crucial 198 
methodological choices in the supplementary section, which are often not indexed (as 199 
suggested by Moon et al [submitted]), we recommend that adequate emphasis is given in the 200 
main text so that the research reporting is robust. As Crotty (1998, page 13) argued: 201 
“We need, of course, to justify our chosen methodology and methods. In the end, we 202 
want outcomes that merit respect.... Our conclusions need to stand up. On some 203 
understandings of research (and of truth), this will mean that we are after objective, 204 
valid and generalisable conclusions as the outcome of our research.”  205 
 206 
The process used by conservation researchers thus needs to be reported on carefully to allow 207 
others to judge the robustness of their study. As the special issue noted, particularly by the 208 
interview paper by Young et al. (2018), articles in the conservation literature often fail to 209 
adequately report on the use of methods, missing key details such as sample size, whether an 210 
interview was piloted, how the data were analysed, and how conclusions were reached. 211 
Although social science data collection cannot always be replicated in the same form as 212 
laboratory-based scientific experiments, this should not provide an excuse for lack of robust 213 
reporting. 214 
 215 
Moon et al. also criticise one of the papers in the special issue for describing qualitative data 216 
as ‘overwhelming’, but this is a fact that has been noted in several social science 217 
methodology guides. Bryman (2008, 538), for example, writes that one of the main 218 
difficulties with qualitative research ‘is that it very rapidly generates a large, cumbersome 219 
database because of its reliance on prose’. The fact that qualitative data can produce such a 220 
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cumbersome database has led social scientists themselves (Miles, 1979, in Bryman, 2008, 221 
538) to describe qualitative data as an ‘attractive nuisance’. We do not believe that pointing 222 
out the fact that qualitative data as overwhelming makes qualitative methods less attractive to 223 
researchers, but rather provides a statement of fact about some of the challenges associated 224 
with carrying out the methodology. This is a caveat that Moon et al. (submitted) would 225 
presumably support us in making. 226 
 227 
Concluding remarks 228 
 229 
Research, whether in the social or natural sciences is complex, is essential if we are to make 230 
progress with the world’s pressing problems. With our unapologetic emphasis on looking for 231 
useful information, we call for more rigorous adoption of methods and for further research on 232 
identifying the nature of conservation problems. Applying interventions, such as the logging 233 
interventions in Moon et al. (submitted), can be introduced in a wide range of ways (e.g. 234 
introduced by local or outsider, starting with a group discussion or talking to key players, 235 
providing funding to individuals or the community). The testing and collation of the 236 
effectiveness of different approaches applied under different conditions would greatly 237 
improve practice.  238 
 239 
At a local scale we need toolkits for practitioners to identify the intricacies of the problem 240 
(e.g. who benefits from the illegal logging, why are those empowered to prosecute 241 
transgressions not doing so, who would undermine the proposed anti-logging interventions 242 
and what could be done to make them support them) and collations of the generalities of the 243 
problem to minimise the need for each programme to start investigating from scratch.  244 
 245 
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In order to improve decision making, which is known to often be seriously flawed 246 
(Sutherland and Burgman, 2015), we need to understand the human values as the underlying 247 
drivers that shape the decisions. The methods covered in the special issue were targeted 248 
towards this aim of understanding these crucial value positions. We hope the readers find the 249 
review of the application of the techniques useful in guiding their choice of methods. Though 250 
the list is not comprehensive in any way (do see Moon et al. for some additional methods), it 251 
provides a first glance into the social science approaches that could be used for decision 252 
making and for understanding human value positions. Through a deeper understanding of 253 
these value positions, we will be able to arrive at better solutions to address the pressing 254 
needs of both conservation research and practice in the coming decades. 255 
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